![]() Of course, this would cause serious delays until the cause of the fault had been established, which in this scenario could prove extremely difficult. In this scenario, I was informed, an expected communication between train and radio block centre would not be received, and default instruction would be to stop the train, and no other trains would be sanctioned to use the “block” of track the train was on. A cheap GSM-r signal disruptor (I found one for £13.83 on e-bay) positioned correctly would prevent communication between onboard ECTS and the Radio Block Centre. Even though this was only my “first pass” at possible technology flaws it was relatively easy to present a scenario that could cause large delays for customers and general stress inducing stoppages. Unsurprisingly, my initial line of disaster enquiry focused around the GSM-r signalling between the RBC and the onboard ECTS and the radio communication via the balise and balise receiver. In response, the RBC issues signal status data informing the driver if the path ahead is clear or otherwise. The train then shares its positional data via the onboard computer ETCS over GSM-r to the Radio Block Centre (RBC). In a nutshell, the track circuits detect the train’s position, which is reported to the train via the balise. ![]() The expected first step will be to adopt ETCS level 2 signalling, as represented in the following diagram: – This system incorporates a new radio system called GSM-r which is essentially the same as vanilla GSM that all our mobile phones used in the previous decade, except it is used for the rail industry (hence the -r). However, over the next 25 years (things move very slowly it seems in rail), the plan is to introduce the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), which amongst other items includes a new signal, control and train protection system, namely, the European Train Control System (ETCS). This information is then fed back to a signal controller who, with the assistance of various software tools, can respond and manage the trains. I learnt that many of the current systems in the UK for controlling rail traffic is analogue and uses fixed block signalling to detect a train is on a specific “block” of the track, this can be performed in a couple of ways, either using track circuits or axle counting. Most of my career has been spent as a cybersecurity senior lecturer, so I approached the topic with the same research rigour as I would pursuing academic journal publications.ĭuring this process, I was fortunate to get an audience (2 coffees and a couple of hours) with a leading practitioner involved in the management of rail signalling system projects (he wishes to remain anonymous). I took this as a great opportunity to research the industry and fathom where the weaknesses exist, and what the worst-case rail scenarios for a cyber breach could be. Recently I was invited to deliver a talk at the Young Rail Professionals Forum at SNC Lavalin in Derby.
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